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to section 1650 would delete references to
the appendix of forms and replace references to the annual tax and registration fee
with references to the new biennial fee.
The proposed amendment would also clarify
the required restoration fee by establishing
the fact that the fee includes not only the new
biennial tax and registration fee, but also a
new delinquent tax and registration fee set
forth in proposed amendments to section
1690(f) and (g) (see below).
- Professional corporations. Recentlyamended law relating to professional corporations authorizes a chiropractor to be a limited corporate shareholder, director, officer,
or employee of a medical corporation, under
certain circumstances. OMBC's proposed
changes to section 1670 would reflect the
inclusion of a chiropractic licensee to these
categories.
- Tax and registrationfee increased.
Recent amendments to Business and Professions Code sections 2455 and 2456.1
authorize an increase in the tax and registration fee which OMBC may charge its
licensees. [14:4 CRLR 196] OMBC's proposed amendments to sections 1690(f), (g),
and (h) would increase the annual tax and
registration fee of $200 to a biennial tax
and registration fee of $600; the proposed
amendments would also fix the delinquency tax and registration fee at $150.
On December 3, OMBC held a public
hearing on all of these proposed changes;
following the hearing, the Board adopted
the amendments. At this writing, the proposed changes are undergoing review by
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
Infection Control Regulations Adopted.
On October 14, OMBC published notice of
its intent to adopt new section 1633, Title 16
of the CCR, which sets forth minimum standards for infection control through citation
to several documents promulgated the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control; the standards
are designed to minimize the transmission of
bloodbome pathogens such as HIV and hepatitis in the health care setting. Following a
December 3 hearing, OMBC adopted the
proposed changes in new section 1633, Title
16 of the CCR.
If the changes are approved by OAL,
this action would bring OMBC into compliance with SB 1070 (Chapter 1180, Statutes of 1991), which requires the Board to
adopt infection control guidelines through
reference to those promulgated by the California Department of Health Services. Since
Business and Professions Code section
2221.1 makes it unprofessional conduct to
fail to follow infection control guidelines,
OMBC plans to distribute these standards
to licensees pending OAL approval. At
this writing, the action awaits approval by
OAL.
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RECENT MEETINGS

At its December 3 meeting, OMBC
heard a presentation by a representative
from Occupational Health Services regarding its rehabilitation and diversion
program for physicians who are impaired
due to substance abuse; the representative
discussed the structure of the program, its
success rate, and its cost per participant.
The Board noted the program's value, but
was concerned about the cost of diversion.
However, if OMBC joins the program, it
would be reimbursed for any expenses by
participating licensees.
Also at its December 3 meeting, OMBC
discussed the necessity of taking a position on the growing use of ultrasound
video for entertainment purposes. The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration has
issued a statement on its position that the
nonmedical use of ultrasound for the purposes of making a home video of an unborn fetus constitutes the improper use of
medical equipment. OMBC declined to
take a position.
Also on December 3, Deputy Attorney
General Alan Mangels discussed the Department of Insurance's (DOI) new Fraud
Division Task Force. DOI's regulations
require all insurance companies to have
special investigative units for the investigation of insurance fraud; these units will
report directly to newly-created district
attorney units specializing in the prosecution of insurance fraud. [14:2&3 CRLR
133; 14:1 CRLR 103-04] OMBC hopes
that this new system will obviate the need
for its own investigation of insurance and
workers' compensation fraud by licensees
and has already asked that several of its
cases be assumed by the appropriate district attorney's office.
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FUTURE MEETINGS

March 4 in Anaheim.
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he California Public Utilities Com-

mission (PUC) was created in 1911 to
regulate privately-owned utilities and ensure reasonable rates and service for the
public. Today, under the Public Utilities
Act of 1951, Public Utilities Code section
201 et seq., the PUC regulates the service
and rates of more than 43,000 privately-

owned utilities and transportation companies. These include gas, electric, local and
long distance telephone, radio-telephone,
water, steam heat utilities and sewer companies; railroads, buses, trucks, and vessels transporting freight or passengers;
and wharfingers, carloaders, and pipeline
operators. The Commission does not regulate city- or district-owned utilities or
mutual water companies.
It is the duty of the Commission to see
that the public receives adequate service
at rates which are fair and reasonable, both
to customers and the utilities. Overseeing
this effort are five commissioners appointed
by the Governor with Senate approval. The
commissioners serve staggered six-year
terms. The PUC's regulations are codified in
Chapter 1,Title 20 of the California Code of
Regulations (CCR).
The PUC consists of several organizational units with specialized roles and responsibilities. A few of the central divisions are: the Advisory and Compliance
Division, which implements the Commission's decisions, monitors compliance with
the Commission's orders, and advises the
PUC on utility matters; the Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA), charged with representing the long-term interests of all utility
ratepayers; and the Division of Strategic
Planning, which examines changes in the
regulatory environment and helps the Commission plan future policy. In February 1989,
the Commission created a new unified
Safety Division. This division consolidated
all of the safety functions previously handled
in other divisions and put them under one
umbrella. The Safety Division is concerned
with the safety of the utilities, railway transports, and intrastate railway systems.
Members of the Commission include
Daniel Win. Fessler, President, Norman
D. Shumway, P. Gregory Conlon, and Jessie J. Knight, Jr. The term of Patricia Eckert
expired on December 31; thus, at this writing, the Commission is functioning with
one vacancy.

U

MAJOR PROJECTS
Commission's Proposed Restructuring of California Electric Service Delivery Generates Sparks. At this writing,
the PUC continues to consider various
proposals to substantially restructure the
delivery of electricity. [14:4 CRLR 197;
14:2&3 CRLR 215; 14:1 CRLR 170]
Traditionally, electric utilities have
been considered "natural monopolies" not
amenable to competition. Such inevitable
monopoly occurs where a high fixed-cost
structure is needed to provide service, as
with utility lines and rights of way which
must be provided "up front" to provide
service. Where a single fixed-plant struc-
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ture can serve all anticipated customers
and business, it is .uneconomic to build a
second duplicative plant, only to have each
operating at low utilization. In most communities, there is only one physical plant
system, e.g., a single set of power lines
making up the "electricity grid."
However, the delivery of power through
lines is only one part of an electricity-delivering monopoly; most such businesses
also produce most of their own electricity
in power plants. In a large state like California with huge utility firms, many sources
generate electricity; generation is not a
natural monopoly function with room for
only one physical plant to operate efficiently. Thus, by separating out the generation of electricity, it might be possible to
narrow the monopoly enterprise to the one
aspect where monopoly is economically
compelled (the delivery of power through
power lines into homes and businesses),
and leave the rest (e.g., the generation of
electricity) to competition.
Thanks to recent technology changes,
the Commission has already opened competition in many telecommunications
markets previously occupied by one entrepreneur (see below). For example, as technology has made it possible for more than
one enterprise to carry telecommunications across long distances, the telephone
company monopoly has been narrowed to
lines and routes (the so-called "loop")
which connect into a home. Phone utilities
are now primarily local, and are required
to "wheel" or provide access to their lines
leading into homes to a variety of competing long distance carriers, charging a use
fee. Electricity is amenable to the same
kind of narrowing. Different and competing firms can produce electricity, and existing electricity utilities may be required
to "wheel" that power for competing
power providers in return for a use charge.
In the alternative, utilities could be required simply to divest themselves of
power generation, and buy power on a
competitive basis from whomever they
choose. The PUC has argued that utility
ties to power production account for the
fact that California's electricity rates are
50% higher than the national average.
The PUC's original plan anticipated
"retail wheeling," where large industrial
users, then commercial consumers, and
finally households (in separate stages)
would be permitted to contract directly
with power producers, and the utilities
would simply collect a fee for use of the
grid to transmit the power to the user.
Consumers could choose to remain users
of the utility's own power generation, and
would be subject to PUC rate review protection.

The PUC also proposed to initiate another policy called "performance-based
ratesetting," which could be implemented
together with or separately from retail
wheeling. Here, the utility's maximum
price would be set based on the average
price of electricity. To the extent the utility
is able to produce (or purchase from others) cheaper electricity and beat the average price, the savings are divided between
ratepayers and stockholders. Under proposed policies, if the utility becomes less
efficient, the losses are also split between
ratepayers and stockholders.
The difficulty for utilities under both
of these proposals is the fate of existing
and inefficient power plants. The utilities
seek a return on existing and sunk investment, which gives them a bias to use costly
power generation where they can pass those
higher costs on to consumers. Retail wheeling and performance-based ratemaking are
each intended to provide a market incentive to generate or find electricity generation more cheaply. However, the PUC has
won the backing of some utilities for its
proposal by requiring ratepayers to pay for
much of the costs of retiring uneconomic
generators.
The initial reaction to the PUC's proposal included objections and concerns,
and generated the following questions:
- Will the phase-in of industrial, then
commercial, and then residential customers lead to industrial "skimming of the
cream" of the best and cheapest power,
with residential users getting what's left?
What will be left for residential userswho have little ability to bargain among
providers-except high-cost power from
inefficient, outmoded plants?
- What will happen in the proposed
system to needed cross-subsidies which
assist low-income ratepayers in securing
basic services?
- What will happen to the state's interest in long-run consequences as reflected
in policies stimulating conservation, power
from renewable sources, and pollution control? Utilities are currently required to obtain
a percentage of their power from environmentally sound sources; will that societal
interest be sacrificed for immediate energy
gratification? What would happen to
fledgling biomass generation (the burning
of discarded plant material-the largest
source of landfill trash) for electricity?
Thus far, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)
has embraced the PUC's plan in its broad
outline. Southern California Edison, however, is bitterly opposed to it. The plan
involves substantial alteration in both laws
and regulations, as well as possible clearance from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) where the system
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seems to be setting "transmission rates"
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Thus far, both FERC and the state legislature have been somewhat critical of aspects of the plan. The legislature is believed to be the most difficult barrier,
given the complexity of the issue, the lobbying strength of Southern California Edison and other opponents, and the noted
distaste of its chief proponent, PUC President Daniel Win. Fessler, for legislative
schmoozing.
Since April 1994, the Commission has
been holding hearings throughout the state
on its deregulation proposal. The original
goal of completion by August was discarded as the hearings spawned substantial interest; more witnesses asked to speak
than time permitted. The list of witnesses at
the October 24 hearing in San Diego is
indicative of the mix of interests seeking
to influence policy; the line-up included
representatives of Southern California Edison, ENRON Gas Services Group, California Energy Coalition, Independent Energy Producers, San Diego Gas & Electric
Company, PG&E, the California Manufacturers Association, the Coalition of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies, Jefferson Electric, the Department of
General Services, the Resources Agency,
the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates, and consumer/environmental groups
Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN),
Utility Consumers' Action Network (UCAN),
and the Environmental Defense Fund.
Consumer groups, including Consumers First, TURN, and UCAN, have been
particularly critical of the plan. Consumers First scheduled organizing meetings of
consumer activists in advance of some of
the PUC hearings, and produced a videotape to educate consumers on the key issues. UCAN mobilized its considerable
membership with the following newsletter
headline: "Ghost of Christmas FutureDickensian Electric Nightmare." TURN
similarly critiqued the plan and presented
an alternative, termed "Community Access to Competitive Energy," to the Commission in September. TURN's plan involves the following elements: (1) cities,
counties, and other local authorities would
be authorized to set up "consumer-owned
utilities" to purchase power transmission
and distribution services from utilities at
regulated prices (choosing their own
sources of power); rates for participating
subscribers would be set by the authority,
as would any cross-subsidies for conservation and nonrenewable resources; and
(2) utilities would be phased out entirely
as producers of power and confined to
transmission. TURN contends that the
suggested alternative is needed so that
165
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otherwise diffuse and powerless consumers can achieve bargaining power to purchase energy on near equal terms with
large industrial users.
In late October and early November,
the new Joint Oversight Committee on
Lowering Electricity Costs, chaired by
Assemblymember Byron Sher and created
by ACR 143 (Sher) (Chapter 148, Resolutions of 1994) [14:4 CRLR 199, 204-05],
convened a series of hearings on the
PUC's proposal. Much of the testimony
before the Oversight Committee concerned the fate of utility "stranded investments"-that is, generators of electric
power which are uneconomic in a competitive marketplace for power generation
which the new policy would create. If left
in place, these high-cost energy producers
would be the major sources of power left
after industry and business (given years of
advance opportunity under the PUC's
phased-in plan) had secured lower-priced
sources for their exclusive use. Witnesses
questioned who would bear the cost of
repaying investors a fair rate of return on
an uneconomic investment if these highcost generators were to be closed down.
Unsurprisingly, the utilities would have
the ratepayers bear the cost; consumer
groups argue that utility owners (investors) should pay because they controlled
the decisions to rely on high-cost options.
An even more difficult question is presented where utility high-cost production
is the result of state- or PUC-imposed
environmental or resource conservation
requirements. However, Severin Bornstein, director of the University of California Energy Project, testified that the critical issue of stranded investments revolves
around nuclear power, now improvidently
providing about 30% of the state's electricity-an option not imposed by the state
and hardly providing an environmentally
sound benefit.
The utilities' advocacy concentrated
on two themes: "Let us continue to produce as well as transmit electricity, but
give us more options from whom we can
buy and allow us to charge ratepayers to
retire our uneconomic plants." Utilities
generally support the ability of users to
pick their own power suppliers, but differ
as to the details. PG&E supports a system
of "supply coordinators" as brokers for
electricity purchase. Other utilities, including Southern California Edison, have
proposed a supplier pool known as
"POOLCO" that would create a central,
independent, private company dispatching electricity from various producers.
On December 7, the Commission issued an "interim decision" in which it
revised the schedule for its release of a
66

policy proposal to restructure the California electric industry. Importantly, the PUC
has moved the agenda from consideration
of an initial phase-in proposal of direct
customer-supplier contracting to three
broad alternative models: (1) wholesale
and retail market reform wherein retail
consumers are able to purchase power
from any entity they prefer and the market
would largely govern the process; (2)
wholesale and retail market reform wherein
a mandatory pool of power generated from
all sources is created through which all purchasers transact business, with an option to
enter into "contracts for differences" outside
the pool; and (3) wholesale reform with a
mandatory pool through which all utilities
transact business, and all consumers continue to purchase from their present utility
provider.
The common element in each of the
three alternatives framed in the PUC's December 7 order is the intended separation
of generation from transmission so that
the former may benefit from market competition. Commentators agree that the challenge for the PUC is to adjust its proposal
so that there is (1) real independence between existing utilities (who want to protect their present sunk investment in uneconomic plants) and the new power generators; (2) both real competition within
the newly-created power generation market and sufficient monitoring to inhibit
antitrust and unfair competition violations,
and (3) some system to supplement the
market to account for the social benefits
of subsidy for low-income ratepayers, and
the long-range benefits of renewable
resource and environmental protection.
Economists studying the issue contend
that the third is optimally an equitable
assessment of all users to provide a modest
subsidy for the very poor, and a series of
fees corresponding to the external costs of
various power production options-allowing a corrected market internalizing those
costs to assess their proper weight. However, such an option would require legislation, and legislation involving fees or
taxes is a difficult prospect-however
necessary and meritorious.
Notwithstanding the extensive series
of public hearings, legal scholars fear that
the PUC's current procedural course appears to have three fatal infirmities. First,
the Commission has "left open the possibility" that its decision may trigger a requirement to complete an environmental
impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The PUC
has not provided for such a report. It is
unclear how the momentous decision it
contemplates does not invoke CEQA's
EIR requirement.

Second, it is unclear how the PUC can
create a naked market as a panacea without reference to serious market flaws
across a spectrum of public policy concers. Environmentalists contend that the
lowest available price in a marketplace for
power may be a very high price for future
generations. A series of statutes and public
policies designed to provide some weight
to those concerns would appear to conflict
with naked relegation to lowest price as
the sole answer. Some consumer advocates concede that the market may be a
proper starting point from which adjustments are made to account for extra-marketplace benefits and costs; they argue that
it is the starting place, not the final answer.
Third, it is unclear how the PUC intends to implement the proposed farreaching change in electricity provision
rules without either legislative changes or
formal rulemaking required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Although "ratesetting" by the PUC does not
require APA rulemaking, the restructuring
proposals at issue appear to involve much
more than the setting of rate levels, and the
procedural course chosen-an alleged
"policy change"-may be later voided as
unlawful "underground rulemaking."
The December 7 revised schedule also
created a working group to comment on
the sustainability of existing social, economic, and environmental programs under
the various restructuring models presented
to the Commission. At this writing, the
working group is scheduled to provide a
written report by February 22. Its membership initially consists of representatives of
the six power utilities directly affected.
Briefs from other interested parties to address how alternative models will affect PUC
obligations under existing state and federal
law are to be filed by January 31. Under
the revised schedule, the Commission will
propose a policy for public comment on
March 22, and adopt its "policy decision"
60 days later, to become effective in early
September 1995.
Some Alternative Power Cogeneration Bids Challenged. In 1986, the Biennial Resource Plan Update (BRPU) was
proposed in order to add alternative energy to the utility power grid. The market
price of electric energy from a given
source does not reflect properly all of its
external or future costs. Market imperfections mean that the indirect costs of pollution or the exhaustion of nonrenewable
materials are not assessed in the production or sale of generated electricity. The
use of power generation methods which
avoid those costs should have that benefit
somehow credited for marketplace inclusion. In addition, there is what economists
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call an "external benefit" not assessed by
the marketplace in having a diverse array
of power sources; power is a necessity for
a modem society and its secure delivery is
enhanced by a diversity of sources able to
fill in should one or two fail.
The BRPU was designed to see whether
alternative energy could compete with traditional sources of power. Hence, private
independent power producers are allowed
to cogenerate power and add it to existing
utility grids for predetermined compensation. In June 1994, the PUC announced the
results of a formal bid process (also known
as the "Final Standard Offer 4" or "FS04")
to determine which producers would be
permitted to add power to the grid; the
average winning bid amounted to 33%
less than current utility alternatives. Producers providing power from gas, wind,
and other energy sources were predicted
to save ratepayers $260 million annually,
and at the same time would add 500 MW
of renewable energy capacity to California
grids. [14:4 CRLR 200]
On October 12, however, the PUC
stayed implementation of the accepted
bids following complaints that some of the
bids were improperly and unrealistically
low. On December 21, the PUC announced
that it would grant a limited rehearing on
its FS04 order awarding 500 MW of renewable energy following complaints by
Southern California Edison, SDG&E,
PG&E, and FloWind Corporation that a
number of "as-available" wind generation
bids should be disqualified. Allegedly,
some bidders overstated capacity factors
and capital costs, and manipulated the accounting to produce low bid scores but
high payments. The PUC's December 21
press release noted that the "as-available
wind bidders" who were the targets of the
complaints are required to file testimony
demonstrating the reasonableness of their
bids; the Commission will disqualify
those which fail to comply with federal
law, and those contracts will be rebid with
new on-line dates established. As to the
rest of contracts (non-"as available" wind),
they will go forward as scheduled, with
the timetables extended for 70 days, reflecting the time of the Commission's stay
(from October 12 to the December 21
decision).
In a related matter, Senators Bill Leonard and Steve Peace introduced SB 25
(Leonard) on December 8. The bill would
abolish the BRPU auction by prohibiting
the PUC from requiring the state's public
utilities to purchase specified portions of
energy from alternative sources (see LEGISLATION). This auction, which implements the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978, is designed to create a

market for innovations in electric generation technologies and shift the electric
generation industry away from the use of
large, centralized oil and coal resources
and towards the use of newer decentralized technologies (such as wind, geothermal, and biomass) which are either renewable or more efficient than those typically
developed by utilities. The rationale for
the program rests with the long-run benefits of stimulating renewable energy to
leave additional resources available for
future generations. The bill's authors contend that eliminating the requirement will
lower immediate prices for California
consumers and enhance the business climate now impeded by state utility rates
above the national mean.
Supporters of the BRPU program have
two arguments. First, they contend that
policymakers should be concerned not
only with the short-term interests of economic consumption but also with the
needs of future generations; we currently
consume vast quantities of nonrenewable
resources-most of which we waste. Those
resources may be extremely valuable 100
or 500 years from now to our legatees, and
we should stimulate power consumption
which does not involve those important
costs that the marketplace does not assess
or reflect without some intervention. Second, they argue that the bidding is only
applied where the PUC finds there is a
need for new capacity. If a utility is operating at near capacity, the addition of new
demand may involve substantial capital
plant expansion, and actually raise average costs substantially. Instead, the BRPU
program requires such utilities to buy
power at close to marginal (lower than
average) cost from alternative energy providers. Hence, not only does the auction
stimulate alternative power, but it does so
at equal or lower utility costs to ratepayers. Accordingly, supporters of BRPU are
not confined to environmental groups, but
include the California Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of
Commerce.
The chief opponent of BRPU is Southern California Edison, which claims that it
is not operating at capacity and does not
need power produced outside its own domain. Proponents argue that Southern California Edison is merely attempting to protect its sunk investment in costly, highpolluting, and outdated generators.
PUC Sets 1995 Rates of Return for
Energy Utilities. On November 22, the
PUC set the return on common equity and
the return on rate base for California energy utilities. The rates of return are critical factors in determining residential and
commercial electric and gas rates. Where
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utilities are not subject to "performancebased ratesetting" [14:4 CRLR 199-200],
they are under the traditional "fair rate of
return" method of calculating maximum
prices for a monopoly power utility. This
method involves calculating anticipated
"prudent costs of operation," and adding
to-them gross profit sufficient to pay for
the capital (plant) investment provided by
investors and lenders. Hence, "used and
useful" investment in plant and overhead
facilities makes up the total "rate base."
Some of the capital to buy these facilities
comes from investors, and some from
lenders (e.g., utility bonds). The interest
rates appropriate to pay each of these
sources varies, since the risk each assumes
varies (in case of losses, the lenders get
paid first). Hence, the "return on common
equity" is the profit or possible dividends
provided to those who gave equity capital
to purchase the plant, and the total "return
on rate base" includes both that equity
percentage and the lower percentage
needed to pay the more secure bondholders and other lenders. In setting rates, the
PUC calculates a proper investment value
for the invested capital (the rate base), and
then applies the percentage return on rate
base for one year to this amount (factoring
in depreciation and needed reserves). The
prudent operating costs mentioned above
are added to this capital need and rates are
set to yield that revenue target.
The allowed equity and debt return to
energy utilities is higher in 1995 than for
1994. Rates of return on equity and on rate
base, respectively, were set as follows for
the major energy utilities: PG&E--12.10%
and 9.79%; SDG&E-12.05% and 9.76%;
Southern California Edison-12. 10% and
9.80%; and Southern California Gas-12%
and 9.67%.
The higher rates of return authorized
will not affect PG&E electric rates which
are subject to a 1995 rate freeze (see below),
nor have substantial impact on SDG&E rates
subject to performance-based ratesetting,
but they do portend rate increases as to
other utilities governed by rate of return
maximum ratemaking.
PUC Sets PG&E 1995 Rates. On December 21, the PUC extended its freeze on
PG&E's electricity rates through 1995.
PG&E gas rates were increased by 3% to
provide the utility with $100 million in
additional operating revenues, effective
January 1, 1995. The freeze on electricity
rates appears to be temporary, since the
PUC has acknowledged an alleged $445.7
million in additional fuel costs which the
utility is "deferring" for later collection. A
typical Bay Area residential natural gas
consumer will see a monthly increase
from $40.83 to $42.06.
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PUC Continues Telecommunications
Deregulation. In December 1993, the PUC
issued a report to the Governor entitled Enhancing California's Competitive Strength:
A Strategy for Telecommunications Infrastructure. The report targeted January 1,
1997, as the date for opening all telecommunications markets to competition. [14:1
CRLR 168-69; 13:4 CRLR 205-06] This
date was legislatively affirmed last year by
AB 3606 (Moore) (Chapter 1260, Statutes
of 1994). [14:4 CRLR 206] Toll call competition, which started on January 1, and proposed competition in the provision of local
phone service are just steps toward reaching
the goals set forth in the report.
IlntraLATA Competition Begins, Higher Basic Rates. On January 1, intraLATA
toll calls (that is, calls that are initiated and
received within the same Local Access
Transport Area or LATA) were opened to
competition. Due to competition, rates for
intraLATA toll calls dropped approximately
40%, but basic monthly rates increased.
[14:4 CRLR 200] The new rate structure is
intended to be revenue-neutral for telecommunications companies, and is designed to
bring basic service rates closer to the costs
of the respective services provided. Critics
contend that the new rate design is not
revenue-neutral, and that it particularly
impacts elderly, low-income, and minority customers. The PUC predicts the median residential customer of GTE will pay
16% more in 1995, and the median Pacific
Bell customer will pay 2% more. The new
mix of charges increases phone bills for
low-volume, local users, which-according to critics of the program--discourages
the "universal service" policy which benefits the system as a whole.
The intraLATA competition ordered by
the PUC gives Pacific Bell and GTE an
advantage over their competitors because
customers must enter a five-digit access
code ("1OXXX") in order to choose a
competitor's service. TURN telecommunications analyst Regina Costa contends that
this access advantage "virtually guarantees
that PacBell and GTE will remain dominant
carriers in the [intraLATA] market." Nineteen states have partially implemented or are
currently pursuing investigations to implement intraLATA "equal access," which allows a consumer to presubscribe with a competitor. This eliminates the need for the
"IOXXX" access code and requires a single
"1" to access a competitor's service. The
PUC is expected to conduct further research
into "equal access" in future months.
- PUC Orders Settlement Talks on Local
Phone Service Competition. On December
21, the PUC challenged the telecommunications industry to negotiate a settlement of
continuing issues impeding competition in
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local service by 1997. Cable and long
distance companies would like to compete
for local service but basic issues such as
pricing, number portability, and phone
book listings have yet to be decided. TURN
Executive Director Audrie Krause criticized
the PUC for telling the telephone companies
to "go out and figure out how to regulate
yourselves [because] we don't want to be
bothered." However, Commissioner Jessie
J. Knight, Jr. said the PUC is seeking not to
delegate its regulatory authority but to "empower the participants," and PacBell VicePresident John A. Gueldner stated that a
negotiated settlement approach "would get
it done even sooner [than the target date of
January 1, 1997]."
Starting on January 1, 1995, parties
have 90 days to work out a settlement on
implementation issues and must issue a
progress report by March 31. In the meantime, proposals for interim rules for competition may be filed up to January 31 with
the Telecommunications Branch of the
PUC's Commission Advisory and Compliance Division (CACD). At this writing,
the Commission plans to issue a proposal
for comment in April, unless a settlement
is reached. In June, the Commission intends to adopt interim rules allowing competitors to seek PUC authority to offer
local service soon thereafter.
Also on December 21, the Commission
announced that it will issue several orders
under the ongoing Open Access and Network Architecture Development (OANAD)
proceeding that ae key steps in freeing local
phone markets to competition. The first of
two orders would address restructuring the
way calls are transmitted; the second would
define the monopoly elements that make up
the phone network in order to break out (or
"unbundle") specific costs. This would
allow competition in providing these unbundled services, and prevent the local exchange carriers (LECs) from abusing their
monopoly position through discriminatory
pricing and cross-subsidies from the market
sector where they retain monopoly power
into newly competitive sectors. An order to
review the present and future status of universal service will be issued in January, calling for both public participation and full
panel hearings. The PUC will submit a report to the legislature by January 1, 1996.
If negotiations fail or issues remain
unresolved, PUC staff will be working on
a parallel track in three broad areas: technical issues including OANAD, local
competition, and regulatory streamlining.
PUC Orders PacBell to Return Lifeline Fund Money, Commences Examination of All Low-Income Programs.
On October 26, the PUC ordered PacBell
to return $8.25 million to the Universal

Lifeline Telephone Service (Lifeline) Fund,
a program which helps ensure that every
household in the state has basic phone
service. The Lifeline Fund receives its revenue from a 4% surcharge on intrastate
and intraLATA toll calls. The purpose of
this limited cross-subsidy is to reflect the
society benefit from "universal service,"
with as many citizens as possible accessible to the communication system which
binds the populace together. The order
adopts a settlement between PacBell and
the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA); approves minor changes in
the charter of the committee which administers the Lifeline Fund; and requires workshops to review General Order (GO) 153,
the Commission's regulations governing
the Lifeline program.
In 1990, CACD audited PacBell's Lifeline reimbursement claims for 1984 through
1989. It advised the Commission in 1992
that it had found five areas of noncompliance
which staff believed amounted to more
than $35 million in overpayments from
the Lifeline Fund to PacBell. [13:1 CRLR
136] PacBell refused to reimburse any
money until it had an opportunity to be
heard. [13:2&3 CRLR 211] In April 1993,
at a preheating conference prior to formal
hearings on the matter, PacBell and DRA
announced they had entered into settlement negotiations. In addition to the return
of $8.25 million, the settlement requires
PacBell to cease seeking reimbursement
for lost revenue due to measured Lifeline
local calls beyond the 60-call allowance
(reducing PacBell's overall Lifeline reimbursement claims by about $600,000 per
year); reduce its per-customer reimbursement claim for time spent by service representatives in explaining Lifeline service
to applicants (amounting to about $300,000
less in claims per year); and waive all
Lifeline reimbursement claims submitted
during the 1984-89 time period (amounting to about $13 million).
CACD's investigation also found that
telecommunications utilities have applied
the Lifeline surcharge inconsistently. For
example, some telecommunication carrers applied the Lifeline surcharge to intraLATA toll private line services, while
others did not. CACD will hold workshops
to revise or replace GO 153, and to specifically define telecommunication services
subject to the Lifeline Fund surcharge.
In a related development, the PUC has
proposed examining all aspects of its programs which assist low-income ratepayers
in securing basic services from public utilities, including Lifeline service and the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE)
program (the PUC's sister program for energy services, formerly known as the Low-
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Income Ratepayer Assistance (LIRA) program). Currently, only income is used to
determine program eligibility; Lifeline customers are not required to show proof of
their income, but CARE customers must do
so. The Commission will consider whether
to evaluate both income and assets when
assessing eligibility, and whether to continue
to allow Lifeline service applicants to selfcertify. At this writing, the PUC plans to hold
a public hearing on its low-income programs
on February 3. Consumer Action (CA) believes that eligibility requirements should be
as simple as possible so that eligible people
can take advantage of the programs; CA
plans to file a brief for the February 3 hearing
urging the PUC to base eligibility solely
upon income and to allow both Lifeline and
CARE participants to self-certify.
PUC Fines Cellular Firms for Siting
Violations. On November 9, the PUC concluded part of its ongoing investigation of all
facilities-based cellular company compliance with its cellular tower siting regulations
in GO 159. Four companies will pay fines
totalling $5,520,000 for various violations to
the state's general fund, and must correct the
violations (Los Angeles Cellular Telephone
company (LACTC)-$5.1 million; Mountain Cellular-$80,000; GTE Mobilnet of
Califomia-$343,000; and Bay Area Cellular-2,000). LACTC admitted that in a
number of instances it failed to file for PUC
approval prior to constructing cellular sites
and failed to obtain required permits from
other government agencies. Additionally,
PUC staff maintains that when the utility did
make the required filings, they contained
inaccurate information.
Prior to 1994, when the violations occurred, fines under Public Utilities Code
section 2107 were limited to $500-$2,000
per offense. Effective January 1, 1994, the
maximum fine was raised. Now a utility
may be fined $500-$20,000 per offense
for violating PUC regulations and each
day a violation exists may be considered
a separate offense. As part of its cellular
siting investigation, the Commission issued an order to show cause to each of the
four companies seeking their explanation
andjustification for apparent violations of
cellular siting regulations. After weighing
the responses, the Commission ordered
the fines.
The Commission also instructed cellular firms to avoid adding new sites without
prior authorization, stated that filings already submitted will be examined on a
case-by-case basis, and reopened a proceeding to consider changes to clarify GO
159.
New Federal Law Terminates PUC
Review of General Freight Transportation Regulation. On October 12, the PUC

issued an order terminating its investigative and rulemaking proceeding regarding
the regulation of general freight transportation by truck. The order was issued in
response to Public Law No. 103-305, a 1994
federal statute that generally deregulates the
price, route, or service of motor carriers
transporting property and air carriers transporting property by motor vehicle, with the
exception of the transportation of household
goods. The PUC had instituted these proceedings to examine whether legislation creating the integrated intermodal small package (IISP) carrier had the unintended effect
of changing the competitive balance between carriers, and to propose changes to its
regulations governing the transportation of
general freight. [14:4 CRLR203-04; 14:2&3
CRLR 218] However, the federal law has
preempted any state economic regulation of
the trucking industry. Because the PUC proceedings involve rate regulation of general
freight transportation by truck, these proceedings are now moot.
The PUC has started to develop guidelines for the implementation of Public
Law No. 103-305. On October 26, the
Commission issued a resolution directing
staff not to enforce requirements preempted by the federal law and to effect
other changes pursuant to the new law. A
subsequent resolution adopted on December 7 detailed more changes. That resolution limits the uses for which certain
Transportation Rate Fund fees are expended, consistent with the federal preemption. All monies paid into the Transportation Rate Fund, based on revenues
from transportation operations on or after
January 1, 1995, by highway carriers (except household goods carriers), will only
be used by the PUC for activities consistent with the new federal law. The activities to be funded are: regulating the safety
and financial responsibility of carriers; licensing carriers subject to federal preemption pursuant to section 601 of Public Law
No. 103-305; and establishing and implementing the state's standard transportation practices specifically permitted by
section 601 of Public Law No. 103-305.
PUC Issues Final Report and Sanctions for 1991 Southern Pacific Train
Derailments. On November 22, the PUC
adopted its final report on the 1991 Southem Pacific Transportation Company (SP)
train derailments at Dunsmuir and Seacliff.
In its final decision, the Commission fined
SP $492,000 for not complying with hazardous material reporting requirements. It
also established train make-up and safety
requirements for all SP trains at the Cantara Loop near Dunsmuir, a 14-degree
curve which is the sharpest curve on SP's
system within California.
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During July 1991, SP was involved in
two train derailments. One occurred near
Dunsmuir in Siskiyou County, spilling
20,000 gallons of toxic metam sodium
into the Sacramento River and killing all
aquatic life and vegetation in or near the
river for a 45-mile stretch; and second
occurred near Seaciff in Ventura County,
spilling 440 gallons of poisonous hydrazine onto a portion of Highway 101 and
causing a shutdown of that portion of the
highway for five days. [11:4 CRLR 164,
204-05] In response to these accidents, in
August 1991, the PUC instituted its own
investigation into the causes of the derailments and SP's compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations, the existence of any local safety hazards, and recommendations for improvements in state
or federal laws and regulations. The Railroad Safety Branch of the Commission's
Safety Division issued separate reports on
each accident. [12:2&3 CRLR 261-62] In
November 1992, a PUC administrative law
judge (ALJ) presided over two weeks of
evidentiary hearings concerning the circumstances of the derailments and accident prevention methods. Each party was
then given an opportunity to submit briefs.
On May 26, 1993, the record was closed
and the matter submitted to the ALJ for
decision. The matter was reopened for an
additional hearing on September 1, 1993.
[13:4CRLR207; 12:2&3CRLR213-14; 13:1
CRLR 138] Closing briefs were submitted
and the record closed. The ALU issued a
proposed decision on the Dunsmuir spill on
September 20, 1994, with opportunity for
comment by both parties and intervenors.
The comments by PUC staff and intervenors
were nonsubstantive and did not significantly alter the decision.
The PUC concluded that the Dunsmuir
derailment was caused by improper train
make-up which, when combined with the
increase of power and negotiation of a
sharp curve, resulted in the generation of
excessive pulling forces at the couplers
and which caused wheel lift on the fourth
car behind the last locomotive. The ideal
train make-up requires that heavy cars be
placed closest to the motive power, and
lighter cars be placed farthest from the
motive power. In this case, the heaviest
cars should have been placed closest to the
power source, which was in the front, with
the lightest cars following. Examination
of the derailed train and records showed
that this was clearly not done. Prior to
reaching the 14-degree Cantara curve, all
eastbound trains (like the derailed train)
must pass through a siding, where speed
is reduced to ten miles per hour. After
leaving the siding, the crew must dramatically increase power to accelerate to the
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Cantara curve recommended track speed
of 20 mph. This created dangerous levels
of pulling and lateral wheel forces.
The PUC adopted new rules that apply
to train operations in the vicinity of the
Dunsmuir spill. The new rules prohibit the
use of the siding track, address train weight,
require the use of helper locomotives, and
prohibit placing short or heavy cars before
long or empty cars. Additionally, metam
sodium, which becomes hazardous only
when mixed with water, has been added to
the Department of Transportation's hazardous list.
The PUC concluded that the Seacliff
derailment was caused when a wheel bearing failed, causing a wheel to separate
from the axle. One of the derailed cars
leaked aqueous hydrazine, and cleanup
was delayed partly because the train crew
did not have a record of how many barrels
of hazardous materials it carried or how
much was in each barrel.
In the Dunsmuir spill, the PUC found
that SP failed to provide the Office of Emergency Services (OES) with a systems map
as required by Public Utilities Code section
7673(a) from July 14,1991 to November 12,
1991, and fined SP $2,000 per day for this
violation, for a total of $244,000. During this
time period, SP also violated Public Utilities
Code section 7673(b), which required SP to
provide OES with an annual publication
detailing emergency guidelines for hazardous materials; for this violation, the Commission also assessed SP $2,000 per day, for
a total of $244,000. The sanctions for the
Seacliff spill were significantly lower$2,000 for not reporting the spill immediately to OES and $2,000 for failing to carry
the emergency handling procedures for
aqueous hydrazine on the train, as required.
PUC Issues Annual Report on Train
Accidents. On December 21, the PUC's
Safety and Enforcement Division reported
that the number of train accidents, excluding grade crossing accidents, dropped from
142 in 1992 to 138 in 1993. However, the
number of persons killed in railroad accidents increased from 123 in 1992 to 162
in 1993. The report noted that most of
those killed were trespassers. The Commission issues this annually to assist agencies in devising ways to reduce train accidents and fatalities.
There were 301 grade crossing accidents in 1993, compared with 319 in 1992.
Most of these occurred because drivers
misguess train speed, fail to look in both
directions, and cross while a slow freight
train approaches without realizing that a
faster train may be hidden behind it.
PUC to Study Intervenor Compensation Reform. In November, the PUC
issued a paper detailing problems with the
.70
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current intervenor compensation process
and called for public participation in a
proceeding to reform the process. The reforms are part of the Commission's Alternatives to Litigation Program, the goal of
which is to streamline the PUC's complaint
resolution process. [14:1 CRLR 171-72]
Under Public Utilities Code section
1801 et seq. and related rules, a public
utility customer who can demonstrate a
significant financial hardship related to
his or her involvement in a Commission
proceeding can receive "intervenor compensation" if he or she has made a "substantial contribution" to the decision. The
paper noted that the current process tends
to discourage alternative dispute resolution; consumer groups also complain
about the arbitrary nature of the "substantial contribution" test, and the excessive
amount of time it takes to receive compensation. t10:1 CRLR 1] PUC President Fessler
noted that the Commission's current intervenor compensation rules were framed in
a trial-type context and reward only a
party's "on-the-record" contributions,
which tends to discourage cooperation,
negotiation, and settlements. While 1992
statutory requirements defined "proceeding" for compensation purposes to include
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) [13:1
CRLR 139], it is difficult for parties to prove
substantial contribution if they compromise
during ADR proceedings.
Another area of concern is the "substantial contribution" requirement. Section 1802(h) defines "substantial contribution" as having "substantially assisted
the Commission in the making of its order
or decision because the order or decision
has adopted in whole or in part one or more
factual contentions, legal contentions, or
specific policy or procedural recommendations presented by the customer." Currently,
this does not guarantee that a signature party
to a settlement agreement, later approved by
the Commission, can demonstrate a substantial contribution.
The "substantial contribution" test has
another problem as applied to agreements:
It rewards a party who endorses a settlement agreement-even if it is a betrayal of
the constituency purportedly represented. If
a party dissents and refuses to sign, and the
Commission later approves that agreement,
the dissenter will be unable normally prove
"substantial contribution." The result of this
incentive system may be "sweetheart' agreements and a false impression that they are
enthusiastically endorsed by all participants.
Another problem with the current compensation system is that it takes too long
to receive actual payments. Dragging out
actual payment favors those with deeper
pockets-traditionally utilities with rate-

payer-supported lawyers and technical experts.
Thus, the Commission announced its
intent to form a "study group" to formulate
a consensus proposal to reform its intervenor compensation process, with an eye
toward encouraging alternatives to litigation. The "study group" will convene
under the direction of PUC ALJ Steven
Weissman.
Alternatives to Litigation Guidelines. In December, the Commission released draft Alternatives to Litigation
Guidelines, which will assist those who
voluntarily wish to use methods other than
litigation to resolve disputes or address
issues before the Commission.
The Guidelines outline five different
alternative dispute resolution procedures.
The first option is unassisted negotiation,
which is the least formal and least coercive
alternative to litigation. Negotiators must
have the authority to agree to a settlement
and confidentiality should be protected
during negotiations. The Commission may
reject a settlement if it resolves issues
significantly affecting the interests of a
person or group that is not adequately
represented in the negotiating process.
The second method is mediation, which
is a flexible, informal process in which a
neutral individual or panel works with two
or more parties to reconcile differences and
resolve disputes.
A third method is facilitation. Unlike a
mediator who tries to obtain a final agreement, the facilitator normally focuses on
the process. The facilitator tries uses techniques that will aid in developing solutions and options. Currently, CACD staff
members serve as facilitators at workshops
which can be used to clarify or resolve a
variety of issues.
A fourth method is early neutral evaluation. In this confidential process, a neutral
third party offers a non-binding assessment
of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the parties' positions and the value of the
case.
The final method is arbitration. In this
procedure, an arbitrator will issue a binding decision and the parties lose some or
all rights to appeal the results. This method
is used primarily for non-precedential, nonratemaking disputes.
At this writing, public comments on the
draft Guidelines will be accepted until January 20. After the comment period, further
changes may be made and the guidelines
will be presented to the PUC for its adoption
in the form of a resolution.

U

LEGISLATION
SB 25 (Leonard), as introduced December 8, would prohibit the PUC from
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requiring energy utilities to purchase specific "resource additions" from alternative
independent power producers which meet
specified standards regarding plant size,
type of fuel, and fuel efficiency; this bill
would abolish the Biennial Resource Plan
Update (BRPU) procedure implemented
by the Commission through which alternative energy producers bid for the right
to sell their energy to utilities at a PUC-determined price (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
[S. EU&C]

U

LITIGATION
On September 15, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Independent Energy Producers Association v.
California Public Utilities Commission,
36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994), holding that
the PUC's regulation of cogeneration "qualification" is preempted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Currently, Title II of the federal Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)
and FERC, its regulating agency, require
utilities to purchase energy from "qualifying cogeneration facilities" (QFs) at a rate
that is equal to the incremental cost to the
utility of purchase elsewhere. Section 201
of PURPA designates a group of facilities
as QFs, which group includes any cogeneration facility that meets operating and
efficiency standards and ownership requirements prescribed by FERC. Pursuant to
federal law, the QFs and the utilities enter
into contracts for the sale and purchase of
electric energy. These contracts contain
standardized terms for the purchase and
sale of electric energy and set the rates to
be paid to the QFs for that energy.
As with the BRPU bid process (see
MAJOR PROJECTS), the purpose of this
requirement is to broaden and diversify
energy sources for the basic power grid by
allowing entre from new and small
sources otherwise shut out by utilities, and
"reduce American dependence on fossil
fuels by promoting increased energy efficiency." Quite apart from the alternative
energy benefits of the very limited BRPU
program described above, if any energy
source can beat the price of alternative
additional energy available to the utility, it
should be given preference.
In 1991, the utilities and the PUC devised a program which authorizes the utilities to monitor the compliance with federal operating and efficiency standards of
the QFs with which they have contracts. If
a utility determines that a QF does not
meet federal operating and efficiency
standards, it is authorized to suspend payment of the rates in the contract and to
substitute a lower "alternative" rate. Independent Energy Producers Association

and other independent cogenerators challenged the PUC's program on grounds that
FERC's authority to enforce PURPA's operating and efficiency requirements is exclusive and that the PUC's program is
preempted by federal law; specifically, it
contended that the PUC's program authorizes the utilities to enforce PURPA's operating and efficiency standards, and thus
represents a state intrusion into an area of
exclusively federal law. The district court
found in favor of the PUC and the utilities.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, sustaining
the position of the independents and holding FERC jurisdiction to be exclusive and
preempting the PUC in enforcing Section
201 of PURPA (which specifies who is a
qualified cogenerator in terms of ownership and efficiency requirements). The
Ninth Circuit specifically criticized the
PUC's policy of delegating to self-interested utilities the authority to penalize independent producers by the assessment of
funds at a level 20% below contract priceto be kept by the utilities. Under PURPA,
the independent cogenerators are entitled
to the incremental avoided cost as compensation; 80% of that amount is nowhere
mentioned in the federal statute. The court
conceded that the PUC has a broad coextensive role in enforcing section 210 of
PURPA; accordingly, it ruled that states
may calculate the rate for incremental
avoided cost and may oversee contracts
consistent with FERC rules. However, the
federal statutory scheme envisions relatively easy "certification" as a qualified
cogenerator; in fact, the cogenerators "selfcertify." If a utility contests the qualification of an entity seeking to sell electricity
as a cogenerator, then FERC may override
that refusal and alternatively certify the
QE PURPA contains no provision allowing a state PUC to become involved in
certification, which should occur before
the contract is awarded, not three or four
years down the road.
In US West Inc. v. United States, 48
F.3d 1092 (Dec. 30, 1994), the Ninth Circuit ruled that the telephone companycable television cross-ownership prohibition of the Cable Franchise Policy and
Communications Act of 1984 (Cable Act)
violates the first amendment. If upheld,
the ruling will mean the entry of telephone
companies into the cable television market.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) originally adopted the crossownership prohibition in 1970 to prevent
telephone companies from gaining an unfair competitive edge in the enhanced services industry by using their monopoly of
telephone transmission facilities, and to
prevent them from financing this expan-
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sion through improper cross-subsidization. In 1984, Congress enacted 47 U.S.C.
section 533(b) as part of the 1984 Cable
Act, which prohibits regional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) from providing
video programming directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas; although legislative history on the provision
is scarce, it indicates that Congress' intent
was to codify the FCC rule and to "prevent
the development of local media monopolies, and to encourage a diversity of ownership of communications outlets." US
West, a BOC that provides local service in
14 states, wants to enter the video programming market in competition with local
cable companies by offering its customers
"video dialtone service," which consists
of constructing and making available
transmission facilities for third parties'
provision of video programming on a
common carrier basis. US West argued
that the cross-ownership provision violates its first amendment rights; the district
court agreed, finding section 533(b) unconstitutional.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Preliminarily, the court rejected the government's
argument that the cross-ownership prohibition should be reviewed on a rational
basis test, and US West's argument that it
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
The court instead applied the "intermediate scrutiny" test of United States v.
O'Brien, and analyzed whether the prohibition 'furthers an important or substantial government interest...and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." On
this issue, the Ninth Circuit found that the
government could not demonstrate Congress' intent due to the paucity of legislative history on the cross-ownership provision; and noted that several agencies, including the FCC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
favor repeal of the provision. Finding that
US West submitted evidence showing that
the goals of section 533(b) are achievable
through less restrictive means, the court
agreed that the ban is unconstitutional as
it "fails the narrow tailoring requirement
of the intermediate scrutiny test."
Pacific Bell believes this ruling enables it to carry out its plan to construct a
$16 billion fiber-optic and coaxial cable
network. [13:4 CRLR 205-06] This new
service would provide video dialtone services (such as movies-on-demand, interactive games, and cable television shows)
in addition to normal telephone service
through a single wire or optical fiber in
each customer's house. Critics acknowledge the benefit of a competitor to the
17

REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION

existing cable monopolies which are still
largely unregulated. However, they remain concerned about possible telephone
cross-subsidization of cable operations
from monopoly loop revenues. One monopoly may end up merely replacing another, except once cable is precluded and
its lines are removed, there may be a more
absolute monopoly free from the prospect
of potential competition from another existing loop. This concern does not lead to
exclusion of telephone company entry
into cable markets, because it does little
good to have a potential competitor who
is categorically precluded from competing. But it does indicate a strong public
interest in regulating telephone entry to
preserve continuing competition.
In Assembly of the State of California v.
Public Utilities Commission, No. S044844,
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown has petitioned the California Supreme Court to review the PUC's disposition of a $49 million
fund established to compensate Pacific Bell
ratepayers for cross-subsidizing Pacific Telesis' development of its wireless operation,
which it recently spun off as a new company
called "AirTouch." In August 1994, the PUC
decided that $7.9 million should be allocated
to PacBell ratepayers through a surcredit on
monthly bills; $40 million should be used for
telecommunications programs and facilities
in public schools statewide; and $2.1 million
should be used to continue the PUC's Telecommunications Education Trust. [14:4
CRLR 201-02] Speaker Brown argues that
all of the money should be refunded to ratepayers, or it should revert to the state general
fund. At this writing, the Supreme Court has
not decided whether to review the PUC's
decision.

U

FUTURE MEETINGS

The full Commission usually meets
every other Wednesday in San Francisco.

STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA
President: Donald Fischbach
Executive Officer:
Herbert Rosenthal
(415) 561-8200 and
(213). 765-1000
TDD for Hearing- and SpeechImpaired:
(415) 561-8231 and
(213) 765-1566
Toll-Free Complaint Hotline:
1-800-843-9053
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he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified

in the California Constitution at Article
VI, section 9. The State Bar was established as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 145,000 members, which
equals approximately 17% of the nation's
population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the Presidentare elected to the Board by lawyers in nine
geographic districts. A representative of the
California Young Lawyers Association
(CYLA), appointed by that organization's
Board of Directors, also sits on the Board.
The six public members are variously selected by the Governor, Assembly Speaker,
and Senate Rules Committee, and confirmed by the state Senate. Each Board
member serves a three-year term, except for
the CYLA representative (who serves for
one year) and the Board President (who
serves a fourth year when elected to the
presidency). The terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and
two public members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 245 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (I) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct, which
are codified at section 6076 of the Business and Professions Code, and promoting
competence-based education; (3) ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The

Bar recommends sanctions to the California Supreme Court, which makes final
discipline decisions. However, Business
and Professions Code section 6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on invol-

untary inactive status if they pose a substantial threat of harm to clients or to the
public, among other reasons.

PROJECTS
*MAJOR
Bar Analyzes Recommendations of
Discipline Evaluation Committee. In
August 1994, the "blue-ribbon" Discipline Evaluation Committee (DEC) chaired
by retired U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Arthur L. Alarc6n released a
report of its eight-month evaluation of the
State Bar's disciplinary system. Established in December 1993 by then-Bar
President Margaret Morrow to conduct the
first external review of the Bar's restructured discipline system, the DEC was to
thoroughly evaluate the structure, cost, effectiveness, and fairness of all components of the Bar's system-including its
Intake/Legal Advice Unit, Office of Investigations (01), Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel (OCTC), State Bar Court (SBC),
and Complainants' Grievance Panel (CGP).
While the DEC's final report contained
high praise for the quality and quantity of
adjudicative decisionmaking by the new
State Bar Court, it nonetheless contained
52 recommendations on a wide spectrum
of issues-including several which have
caused controversy within the Bar. A
major theme of the DEC report is that the
Bar, particularly the State Bar Court, has
devoted excessive resources to upper
management and supervisory positions,
while other components have been underresourced. [14:4 CRLR 209-10]
In September, new Bar President Donald Fischbach appointed Discipline Committee Chair James Towery to head the
Task Force on Implementation of the DEC
Report, and directed the Task Force to
commence an initial analysis of the DEC
report and recommend a procedure whereby
the Discipline Committee and full Board
could take action on those recommendations as appropriate. Fischbach instructed
the Task Force to present its initial analysis at the Bar's October meeting.
Following two public hearings during
September, the Task Force presented its
analysis to the Board at its October 30
meeting. The Task Force categorized the
recommendations in the DEC report as
follows:
- Recommendations that are already
implemented or in place: With regard to
the State Bar Court, the Task Force noted
that the Bar already reduced the time of
two of its three Review Departmentjudges
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